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1Equilibria of Channel Selection Games in Parallel
Multiple Access Channels
S.M. Perlaza, S. Lasaulce and M. Debbah.
Abstract
In this paper, the parallel multiple access channel (MAC) is studied under the assumption that transmitters
maximize their individual spectral efficiency by selfishly tuning their power allocation policy. Two particular
scenarios are studied: (a) transmitters are allowed to use all the available channels; and (b) transmitters are
constrained to use a single channel. Both scenarios are modeled by one-shot games and the corresponding sets
of Nash equilibria (NE) are fully characterized under the assumption that the receiver treads the multiple access
interference as noise. In both cases, the set of NE is non-empty. In the case in which transmitters use a single
channel, an upper bound of the cardinality of the NE set is provided in terms of the number of transmitters and
number of channels. In particular, it is shown that in fully loaded networks, the sum spectral efficiency at the NE
in scenario (a) is at most equal to the sum spectral efficiency at the NE in scenario (b). A formal proof of this
observation, known in general as a Braess Paradox, is provided in the case of 2 transmitters and 2 channels. In
general scenarios, we conjecture that the same effect holds as long as the network is kept fully loaded, as shown
by numerical examples. Moreover, the price of anarchy and the price of stability in both games is also studied.
Interestingly, under certain conditions on the channel gains, Pareto optimality can be achieved at some NE if and
only if the number of channels equals or exceeds the number of transmitters. Finally, simulations are presented to
verify the theoretical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple access channels (MAC) correspond to a communication scenario where several transmitters
communicate with a single receiver trough a common channel [1]. In parallel MAC, each transmitter
can exploit a common set of orthogonal channels to communicate with the receiver. Often, channel
orthogonality is assumed in the frequency domain, and thus, channels can be understood as different non-
overlapping frequency bands. This model allows one to study communication scenarios such as 802.11-
based wireless local area networks (WLANs) [2], [3], distributed soft or hard handovers in cellular systems
[4], or throughput-maximizing power control in multi-carrier code division multiple access (MC-CDMA)
systems [5].
In this paper, we analyze the parallel MAC assuming that transmitters selfishly maximize their individual
spectral efficiency (ISE) by autonomously selecting a single channel to perform their transmission. Here,
the channel selection policy is not imposed by the receiver to the transmitters, which justifies the terms
decentralized parallel MAC. The motivation for studying this scenario and, in particular, the limitation
of using a single channel for transmitting, stems from the fact that this is often a practical constraint in
some wireless networks, for instance, Wi-Fi networks. Moreover, the choice of enforcing radio devices
to use only a subset of all the available channels has been proved to be beneficial in the case of rate-
efficient centralized parallel MAC when using successive interference cancellation [4]. In the case of
energy-efficient decentralized parallel MAC, it has been shown that using a single channel is a dominant
strategy [5]. Within this framework, we study this scenario, to which we refer to as channel selection
(CS) problem, using a one-shot game model. The players (the transmitters) have discrete action sets (the
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2channels) and their utility function (performance metric) corresponds to their ISE. Our interest focuses on
the analysis of the set of Nash equilibria (NE) [6] of this game. The relevance of the NE relies, in part,
on the fact that it describes a network state where the channel used by each transmitter is individually
optimal with respect to the channels adopted by all the other transmitters in the network. Another reason
is that an NE can be reached in a fully decentralized fashion when radio devices interact during certain
time following particular behavioral rules [7], [8].
We distinguish the CS game described above from the power allocation (PA) game. In the PA game,
transmitters can simultaneously use all the available channels, and thus, the set of actions is a convex
and closed set [9]. Indeed, the PA problem in decentralized parallel MAC has been well investigated in
the wireless literature [9]–[13]. In these works, the main contribution consists in conducting a complete
analysis of the set of NE of the corresponding one-shot games. Nonetheless, very few is known about
the set of equilibria in decentralized parallel MAC, with CS policies. As we shall see, by dropping the
convexity of the set of actions, fundamental differences arise. For instance, the uniqueness of the NE no
longer holds.
Although the parallel MAC is, in terms of signal model, a special case of the MIMO (multiple input
multiple output) interference channel (IC), the NE analysis of the MIMO-IC [14]–[18] does not directly
apply to the case of parallel MAC. First, [10], [11] address the case of fast fading links and shows
substantial differences between both models especially in terms of the uniqueness of the NE. Second, even
if identical channel variation models are considered in the MIMO-IC and parallel MAC, the sufficient
condition for the uniqueness of the NE derived in [14], [19] for static or block fading IC, can be shown
to hold with probability zero in parallel MAC [9]. In particular, the sufficient condition for the uniqueness
of the NE provided in [14] is not necessary in general [20]. The (more explicit) sufficient conditions for
uniqueness given by [19] are generally not verified in parallel MAC. More precisely, from [19] it is implied
that there exists a unique pure NE with high probability when for each point-to-point communication the
signal dominates the interference. This condition is clearly not verified in parallel MAC. For instance, in a
2-user parallel MAC, if one user’s signal is dominated by the interference, the converse holds for the other
user. Finally, we highlight that in the parallel MAC, when single-user decoding (SUD) is assumed at the
receiver, both the compact power allocation and channel selection games have a special structure, namely,
they are potential games [21] or more specifically, best-response potential games [22]. This structure is
not observed in the case of the MIMO-IC model. In Sec. III, we discuss the implications and advantages
derived from this fact.
Within this context, the main contributions of this paper are described hereunder.
• The set of NE of the decentralized parallel MAC is fully described in the case of CS policies and
single user decoding at the receiver. This set is shown to be non-empty and an upper bound of its
cardinality is provided as a function of the number of transmitters and available channels.
• In the 2-transmitter 2-channel case, it is formally proved that for any realization of the channel
gains, there always exists at least one NE in the CS game that produces a higher or equal network
spectral efficiency (NSE) than the unique NE in the PA game. In wireless communications, this kind
of observations is often associated with a Braess type paradox [23] as in [20], [24], [25], where
similar observations have been made in other scenarios. For an arbitrary number of transmitters and
channels, we only provide numerical results that support the aforementioned claim.
• The set of NE of the decentralized parallel MAC is also studied in the asymptotic regime, that is for
a large number of transmitters in the case of CS policies. In this context, we provide closed-form
expressions of the fraction of players which transmit over each channel as a function of the ratio
between the channel bandwidth and the total available bandwidth (sum of all channel bandwidths).
• Finally, we study the efficiency of the set of equilibria in terms of the price of anarchy and the price
of stability. We provide closed-form conditions over which no loss of performance is observed at the
equilibrium in both the power allocation game and the channel selection game.
The content of this paper can be briefly summarized as follows. In Sec. II, the system and game models
are described. In Sec. III, we revisit the existing results regarding the PA problem and we provide new
3results on the CS problem in terms of existence and uniqueness of the NE. In Sec. IV, the contribution
aforementioned are fully detailed. In Sec. V, we present simulation results in order to verify our theoretical
results. The paper is concluded by Sec. VI.
II. MODELS
A. System Model
Let us define the sets K 4= {1, . . . , K} and S 4= {1, . . . , S}. Consider a parallel multiple access channel
with K transmitters and S channels (namely non-overlapping bands). Denote by y = (y1, . . . , yS)
T the
S-dimensional vector representing the received signal, which can be written in the baseband at the symbol
rate as follows
y =
K∑
k=1
Hkxk +w. (1)
Here, ∀k ∈ K, Hk is the channel transfer matrix from transmitter k to the receiver, xk is the vector of
symbols transmitted by transmitter k, and vector w represents the noise observed at the receiver. We will
exclusively deal with the scenario where the matrices Hk are S-dimensional diagonal matrices (parallel
MAC), i.e., Hk = diag (hk,1, . . . , hk,S). In our analysis, block fading channels are assumed. Hence, for
each channel use, the entries hk,s, for all (k, s) ∈ K × S, are time-invariant realizations of a complex
circularly symmetric Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit variance. Here, we assume that
each transmitter is able to perfectly estimate its own channel realizations (coherent communications),
i.e., the channels hk,1 . . . hk,S for transmitter k. The vector of transmitted symbols xk, ∀k ∈ K, is an
S-dimensional complex circularly symmetric Gaussian random variable with zero mean and covariance
matrix P k = E
(
xkx
H
k
)
= diag (pk,1, . . . , pk,S). Assuming the transmit symbols to be Gaussian and
independent is optimal in terms of spectral efficiency, as shown in [26], [27]. For all (k, s) ∈ K×S , pk,s
represents the transmit power allocated by transmitter k over channel s and transmitters are power-limited,
that is,
∀k ∈ K,
S∑
s=1
pk,s 6 pk,max, (2)
where pk,max is the maximum transmit power of transmitter k. A PA vector for transmitter k is any vector
pk = (pk,1, . . . , pk,S) with non-negative entries satisfying (2). The noise vector w is an S-dimensional
zero mean Gaussian random variable with independent, equal variance real and imaginary parts. Here,
E
(
wwH
)
= diag (σ21, . . . , σ
2
S), where, σ
2
s represents the noise power over channel s. We respectively
denote the noise spectral density and the bandwidth of channel s by N0 and Bs, thus, σ2s = N0Bs. The
total bandwidth is denoted by B =
∑S
s=1Bs.
B. Game Models
The PA and CS problems described in Sec. I can be respectively modeled by the following two non-
cooperative static games in strategic form (with i ∈ {a, b}):
G(i) =
(
K,
(
P(i)k
)
k∈K
, (uk)k∈K
)
. (3)
In both games, the set of transmitters K is the set of players. An action of a given transmitter k ∈ K is
a particular PA scheme, i.e., an S-dimensional PA vector pk = (pk,1, . . . , pk,S) ∈ P(i)k , where P(i)k is the
set of all possible PA vectors which transmitter k can use either in the game G(a) (i = a) or in the game
G(b) (i = b). An action profile of the game i ∈ {a, b} is a super vector
p = (p1, . . . ,pK) ∈ P(i),
4where P(i) is a set obtained from the Cartesian product of all the action sets, i.e., P(i) = P(i)1 × . . .×P(i)K ,
where,
P(a)k =
{
(pk,1, . . . pk,S) ∈ RS : ∀s ∈ S, pk,s > 0,
∑
s∈S
pk,s 6 pk,max
}
, and
P(b)k = {pk,max es : ∀s ∈ S, es = (es,1, . . . , es,S) ,∀r ∈ S \ s, es,r = 0, and es,s = 1} .
In the sequel, we respectively refer to the games G(a) and G(b) as the PA game and CS game. Moreover,
we drop the super-indices (a) or (b) when interchangeably referring to the game G(a) or G(b).
Let us denote by p−k any vector in the set
P(i)−k
4
= P(i)1 × . . .× P(i)k−1 × P(i)k+1 × . . .× P(i)K (4)
with (i, k) ∈ {a, b} × K. For a given k ∈ K, the vector denoted by p−k represents the strategies adopted
by all the players other than player k. With a slight abuse of notation, we can write any vector p ∈ P(i)
as
(
pk,p−k
)
, in order to emphasize the k-th component of the super vector p. The utility for player k in
the game G(i) is its spectral efficiency uk : P(i) → R+, and
uk(pk,p−k) =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2 (1 + γk,s) [bps/Hz], (5)
where γk,s is the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) seen by player k over its channel s, i.e.,
γk,s =
pk,sgk,s
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{k}
pj,sgj,s
, (6)
and gk,s , |hk,s|2. Note that from (6), it is implied that single-user decoding (SUD) is used at the receiver.
The choice of SUD is basically due to scalability (in terms of signaling cost) and fairness for the decoding
scheme. Clearly, optimality is not sought here, nonetheless, these constraints are inherit to the decentralized
nature of the network.
As a solution concept for both G(a) and G(b), we focus on the notion of NE [6], which we define, using
our notation, as follows,
Definition 1 (Pure Nash Equilibrium): In the non-cooperative games in strategic form G(i), with i ∈
{a, b}, an action profile p ∈ P(i) is a pure NE if it satisfies, for all k ∈ K and for all p′k ∈ P(i)k , that
uk(pk,p−k) > uk(p′k,p−k). (7)
The relevance of the NE is that at such state, the PA or CS policy chosen by any transmitter is optimal
with respect to the choice of all the other transmitters. Thus, in a decentralized network, the NE is a
stable network state, since no player has a particular interest in deviating from the actual state.
In the following, we provide some fundamental results which we use in the further analysis of the games
G(a) and G(b).
III. AUXILIARY RESULTS
In this section, we introduce some existing results on the existence and uniqueness of the NE in the
games G(a) and G(b). For doing so, we use the fact that both games G(a) and G(b) have been shown to be
potential games (PG) [21], [28] in [4] and [29], respectively. We conclude this section, by introducing a
new result which allows us to establish an upper bound on the number of NE that the game G(b) might
possess.
5A. General Results
The analysis presented in the following strongly relies on the fact that both games G(a) and G(b) are
potential games. Thus, for the sake of completeness, we define exact PGs using our notation.
Definition 2 (Exact Potential Game): Any game in strategic form defined by the triplet
G = (K, (Pk)k∈K , (uk)k∈K)
is an exact potential game if there exists a function φ (p) for all p ∈ P = P1 × . . . × PK such that for
all players k ∈ K and for all p′k ∈ Pk, it holds that
uk(pk,p−k)− uk(p′k,p−k) = φ(pk,p−k)− φ(p′k,p−k).
Note that the utility function of player k can be written as follows,
uk
(
pk,p−k
)
= φ(p)− υk
(
p−k
)
, (8)
where,
φ(p) =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s +
K∑
k=1
pk,sgk,s
)
and, (9)
υk
(
p−k
)
=
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
σ2s + ∑
j∈K\{k}
pj,sgj,s
 . (10)
Interestingly, the first term φ(p) does not depend on the index of k and the term υk
(
p−k
)
does not depend
on the actions of player k. Thus, the results initially mentioned by the authors in [4] and [29] follow
immediately from (8) and Def. 2:
Lemma 1: The strategic form games G(i), with i ∈ {a, b}, are exact potential games with potential
function φ(p) : P(i) → R+ defined in (9).
The relevance of PG relies on the fact that it is a class of games for which the existence of at least
one pure NE is always guaranteed [21]. Additionally, many known learning procedures, such as, best
response dynamics, fictitious play and some reinforcement learning dynamics converge in PG. As a
consequence, any of these dynamics can be used to implement algorithms to achieve an equilibrium in
a fully decentralized fashion. Nonetheless, we leave the design of decentralized techniques for achieving
NE out of the scope of this paper and we focus on the analysis of the equilibria. We refer the interested
reader to [7], [8], [13], [14], [30] for more details. In the following, we use Lemma 1 to analyze the set
of NE of both our power allocation game G(a) and our channel selection game G(b).
B. Known Results Concerning the Power Allocation Game G(a)
In the following, we comment on the existence and uniqueness of the NE in G(a).
1) Existence of a NE: Regarding the existence of pure NE, the following lemma is an immediate
consequence of our Lemma 1 and Lemma 4.3 in [21].
Lemma 2 (Existence of a pure NE): The game G(a) has always at least one NE in pure strategies.
Regarding the existence of a mixed NE (i.e., a probability distribution on the possible actions which verifies
Definition 1), it follows from [31], that the existence of at least one NE in mixed strategies always exists.
This is basically because the action spaces, P(a)k are compact spaces and the utility functions are continuous
with respect to the action profile. However, in compact strategy spaces, mixed strategies are generally less
attractive due to the difficulty of its implementation in wireless communications systems [8].
62) Uniqueness of the pure NE: In the game G(a), the uniqueness of the NE has been shown to hold
with probability one [9].
Theorem 1 (NE uniqueness in parallel MAC): The game G(a) has almost surely a unique pure NE.
A formal proof of Theorem 1 is provided in [9]. This proof is based on the concept of degeneracy which
allows one to characterize the directions along which the potential remains constant. A simpler proof, for
the special case of 2 -players and 2-channels is given in [32].
3) Determination of the NE: From Def. 2, it follows that the unique NE in pure strategies, denoted by
p†, is the unique solution of the following optimization problem:
arg max
p∈P(a)
φ (p) . (11)
The components of the PA vector p† in (11) are for all (k, s) ∈ K × S,
p†k,s =
BsB 1βk −
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{k}
p†j,sgj,s
gk,s

+
, (12)
where, βk is a Lagrangian multiplier chosen to saturate the power constraints (2). Note that this result
shows the connections between the notion of NE and the well-known water-filling PA policy [13]. For a
further discussion on this connection, the reader is referred to [7], [8].
C. New Results Concerning the Channel Selection Game G(b)
In the game G(b), it can be checked that given a vector p−k ∈ P(b)−k, it follows that ∀k ∈ K and
∀pk ∈ [0, pk,max], the potential function satisfies that φ
(
pk es,p−k
)
6 φ
(
pk,max es,p−k
)
, where es =
(es,1, . . . , es,S) ∈ RS , ∀r ∈ S \ s, es,r = 0, and es,s = 1. Thus, the problem of transmit power control
disappears and there is no lost of generality by choosing the action sets as P(b)k . Technically, the main
difference between G(a) and G(b) is that the latter is a finite game (|K × S| < +∞). In the following, we
investigate the consequences of this fact on the existence and multiplicity of the NE .
1) Existence of a pure NE: Regarding the existence of at least one NE in pure strategies, we have that
from our Lemma 1 and Corollary 2.2 in [21], the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3 (Existence of a pure NE): The game G(b) has always at least one NE in pure strategies.
Regarding the existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies, we have that given that the actions sets are
discrete and finite, then the existence of at least one NE in mixed strategies is ensured [6].
2) Multiplicity of the pure NE: In the following, we show that multiple NE might exists in the game
G(b).
Proposition 1: Let Kˆ ∈ N be the highest even number which is less or equal to K. Then, the game
G(b) has L pure NE strategy profiles, where,
1 6 L 6 1 + (S − 1)
∑
i∈{2,4,...,Kˆ}
(
K
i
)
. (13)
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. This proof relies on the fact that whenever a player
deviates from a given action profile p, it achieves a different utility. That is, given a set of channels
{gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S , it holds that uk(p) 6= uk(p′), where p′ is obtained by letting only one transmitter to deviate
from p. This holds from the fact that the channel realizations are drawn from a continuous distribution and
thus, Pr (uk(p) = uk(p′) | p 6= p′) = 0. Thus, under this condition, if p is an NE, then p′ is not and vice
versa. Following this procedure, a set of action profiles can be eliminated and only some actions profiles
which are NE candidates are left over. In this way, a bound on the maximum number of equilibria can
be provided independently of the exact channel realizations and only relying on the parameters K and S.
7Fig. 1. (a) Non-oriented graph and (b) oriented graph representing the game G(b) with K = 3, S = 2, under the condition φ(p(2)) >
φ(p(6)) > φ(p(1)) > φ(p(5)) > φ(p(4)) > φ(p(7)) > φ(p(8)) > φ(p(3)). Total number of vertices: SK = 8, number of neighbors per
vertex: K(S − 1) = 3. Maximum Number of NE: 4. Number of NE: 2 (red vertices in (b)).
Indeed, this is one of the main properties of the bound provided by Proposition 1 since, a calculation of
the exact number of NE becomes cumbersome when the number of transmitters K and channels S grows
to infinity. As we shall see, the bound in Proposition 1 holds with strict equality in the case of K = 2
transmitters and S = 2 channels, that is, 1 6 L 6 2. For an arbitrary number of transmitters K > 2 and
channels S > 2, the bound is not tight. This is basically because, some of the action profiles obtained using
the elimination processes described before might be mutually exclusive of the set of NE. For instance, in
the game G(b) with K = 3 and S = 2, the set of power allocation vectors pmax (e1, e1, e1), pmax (e1, e2, e2),
pmax (e2, e2, e1), and pmax (e2, e1, e2) might all be NE candidates. Nonetheless, if pmax (e1, e1, e1) is an
equilibrium for a given vector of channels {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S , then the other three action sets are not NE for
the same set of channels and vice-versa. Thus, only 3 out of the 4 candidates can be NE simultaneously.
The exact number of NE can be determined following the method described in the following section, but
it requires the complete knowledge of the channel gains. Proposition 1 aims at providing an estimation
based only on the parameters K and S.
3) Determination of the NE: In order to fully identify the action profiles corresponding to an NE, we
use the graph G described in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A. Basically, we convert the non-
directed graph G into an oriented graph Gˆ whose adjacency matrix is the non-symmetric square matrix
Aˆ whose entries are ∀(i, j) ∈ I2 and i 6= j,
aˆij =
{
1 if i ∈ Vj and φ
(
p(j)
)
> φ
(
p(i)
)
0 otherwise , (14)
and aˆi,i = 0 for all i ∈ I. The set Vj contains the indices of all the vector that can be obtained by
letting only one player to deviate from the action profile p(j). This set is also called the neighborhood
of action profile p(j). More specifically, in the oriented graph Gˆ, there exists an edge or arrow starting
in vertex vi and ending in vertex vj , i.e., aˆij = 1, if and only if φ(p(j)) > φ(p(i)) and φ(p(i)) is in the
neighborhood of φ(p(j)). Note that the first condition for adjacency in Gˆ represents the assumption of
rational players. That is, a player changes its strategy if the new strategy brings a higher utility, i.e., it
increases the potential function. The second condition enforces the fact that only one player can deviate
at a time from the initial action profile p(i). In Fig. 1, we show an example of the non-directed G graph
and how it is transformed into an oriented graph Gˆ for the case where K = 3 and S = 2.
From the definition of the matrix Aˆ, we have that a necessary and sufficient condition for a vertex vi
to represent an NE action profile is to have a null out-degree in the oriented graph Gˆ, i.e., there are no
outgoing edges from the node vi (sink vertex). Finally, one can conclude that determining the set of NE
in the game G(b) boils down to identifying all the sink vertices in the oriented graph Gˆ. Note that this
method can be used only to determine the whole set of NE. It does not pretend to be an algorithm which
can be directly implemented in decentralized wireless networks, since it requires complete information
at each transmitter. Methods for achieving equilibria in wireless networks are described in [7], [8], [13],
[14], [30].
8IV. EQUILIBRIUM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND SPECIAL CASES
In this section, we study in detail two special cases of relevant interest to understand previous conclu-
sions and provide more insights into decentralized power allocation problem in terms of design. First, the
games G(a) and G(b) are studied assuming that there exist only K = 2 transmitters and S = 2 available
channels. In particular, we analyze the set of NE action profiles of both games and compare the network
spectral efficiency (NSE), U (i) : P(i) → R, obtained by playing both games. Here, for all i ∈ {1, 2},
U (i)(p1, . . . ,pK) =
K∑
k=1
uk(p1, . . . ,pK) [bps/Hz]. (15)
From this analysis, we conclude that limiting the transmitters to use a single channel brings a better
result in terms of network spectral efficiency (15). Second, we consider the case of a large number of
transmitters. This study leads to two important conclusions: (i) the fraction of players using a given
channel depends mainly on the bandwidth of each channel and not on the exact channel realization nor
the number of players and channels; (ii) in the asymptotic regime (K →∞) both games exhibit the same
performance. Before we start, let us introduce the notion of best response correspondence, since it plays
a central role in the following analysis.
Definition 3 (Best-Response Correspondence): In a non-cooperative game described by the 3-tuple(K, (Pk)∀k∈K , (uk)∀k∈K), the relation BRk : P−k → Pk such that
BRk
(
p−k
)
= arg max
qk∈Pk
uk
(
qk,p−k
)
, (16)
is defined as the best-response correspondence of player k ∈ K, given the actions p−k adopted by all the
other players.
A. The 2-Transmitter 2-Channel Case
Consider the games G(a) and G(b) with K = 2 and S = 2. Assume also that ∀k ∈ K, pk,max = pmax and
∀s ∈ S , σ2s = σ2 and Bs = BS . Denote by SNR = pmaxσ2 the average signal to noise ratio (SNR) of each
active communication.
1) The power allocation game: Let us denote by p† =
(
p†1,p
†
2
)
the NE of the game G(a). Then,
following Def. 1, one can write the following set of inclusions,
∀k ∈ K, p†k ∈ BRk
(
p†−k
)
. (17)
Note that, for all k ∈ K and for all p−k ∈ P(a), the set BRk
(
p−k
)
is a singleton (Def. 3) and thus, (17)
represents a system of equations. By solving the resulting system of equations (17) for a given realization
of the channels {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S , one can determine the NE of the game G(a). We present such a solution
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Nash Equilibrium in G(a)): Let the action profile p† =
(
p†1,p
†
2
)
∈ P(a), with p†1 =(
p†11, pmax − p†11
)
and p†2 =
(
pmax − p†22, p†22
)
be an NE action profile of the game G(a) with channel
realizations g = (g11, g12, g21, g22). Then, with probability one, p† is the unique NE and it can be written
as follows:
• Equilibrium 1: if g ∈ A1 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
1+SNRg11
1+SNRg22
, g21
g22
6 1+SNRg11
1+SNRg22
}
, then, p†11 = pmax and
p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 2: if g ∈ A2 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 > 1 + SNR (g11 + g21) ,
g21
g22
> 1 + SNR (g11 + g21)
}
,
then, p†11 = pmax and p
†
22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 3: if g ∈ A3 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6 11+SNR(g12+g22) ,
g21
g22
6 1
1+SNR(g12+g22)
}
then, p†11 = 0
and p†22 = pmax.
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g22
for the two-player-two-channel game G(a). The
function ψ : R+ → R+ is defined as follows: ψ(x) = 1 + SNRx. The best response function BRk(p−k), for all k ∈ K, is defined by
(12). Here, it has been arbitrarly assumed that ψ(g21)
ψ(g12)
< ψ(g11)
ψ(g22)
.
• Equilibrium 4: if g ∈ A4 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
1+SNRg21
1+SNRg12
, g21
g22
> 1+SNRg21
1+SNRg12
}
, then, p†11 = 0 and p
†
22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 5: if g ∈ A5 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
g21
g22
, 1+SNRg11
1+SNRg22
< g21
g22
< 1 + SNR (g11 + g21)
}
, then,
p†11 = pmax and p
†
22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2g22 +
σ2+g11pmax
g21
)
.
• Equilibrium 6: if g ∈ A6 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
g21
g22
, 1
1+SNR(g12+g22)
< g11
g12
< 1+SNRg11
1+SNRg22
}
, then,
p†11 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2g11 +
σ2+pmaxg22
g12
)
and p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 7: if g ∈ A7 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
g21
g22
, 1+SNRg21
1+SNRg12
< g11
g12
< 1 + SNR (g11 + g21)
}
, then,
p†11 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2+pmaxg21g11 + σ
2
g12
)
and p†22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 8: if g ∈ A8 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
g21
g22
, 1
1+SNR(g12+g22)
< g21
g22
< 1+SNRg21
1+SNRg12
}
, then, p†11 = 0
and p†22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2+g12pmaxg22 + σ
2
g21
)
.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B.
In Fig. 2 we plot the different types of NE of the game G(a) as a function of the channel ratios g11g12 andg21
g22
. Note that under the knowledge of all channels, the set of all possible pure NE can be obtained by
simply placing the point
(
g11
g12
, g21
g22
)
in Fig. 2 . The uniqueness of the NE is not ensured under certain
conditions. In fact, infinitely many NE can be observed, however, the conditions for this to happen are
zero probability events, as we shall see in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Let α
4
= g11
g21
= g12
g22
and assume that the set of channels {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S satisfies the following
conditions
1
1 + pmax
σ2
(g12 + g22)
< α < 1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) ,
Then, any PA vector p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22) ∈ P(a), such that
p11 =
1
2
(
pmax (1− α) + σ2
(
1
g12
− 1
g11
))
+ αp22
10
is an NE action profile of the game G(a).
The proof of Lemma 4 is the first part of the proof of Proposition 2. In the next subsection, we perform
the same analysis presented above for the game G(b).
2) The channel selection game: When K = 2 and S = 2, the game G(b) has four possible outcomes,
i.e.,
∣∣P(b)∣∣ = 4. We detail such outcomes and its respective potential in Fig. 3. Following Def. 1, each
of those outcomes can be an NE depending on the channel realizations {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S , as shown in the
following proposition.
Tx1\Tx2 p2=(pmax,0) p2=(0,pmax)
p1=
(pmax,0)
1
2 log2(σ2+pmax(g11+g21))
+12 log2(σ2)
1
2 log2(σ2+pmaxg11)
+12 log2(σ2+pmaxg22)
p1=
(0,pmax)
1
2 log2(σ2+pmaxg12)
+12 log2(σ2+pmaxg21)
1
2 log2(σ2+pmax(g12+g22))
+12 log2(σ2)
Fig. 3. Potential function φ of the game G(a), with K = 2 and S = 2. Player 1 chooses rows and player 2 chooses columns.
Proposition 3 (Nash Equilibria in G(b)): Let the PA vector p∗ = (p∗1,p∗2) ∈ P(b) be one NE in the game
G(b). Then, depending on the channel gains g = (g11, g12, g21, g22), the NE p∗ can be written as follows:
• Equilibrium 1: when g ∈ B1 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 > 11+SNRg22 and
g21
g22
6 1 + SNRg11
}
, then, p∗1 =
(pmax, 0) and p∗2 = (0, pmax).
• Equilibrium 2: When g ∈ B2 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 > 1 + SNRg21 and
g21
g22
> 1 + SNRg11
}
, then,
p∗1 = (pmax, 0) and p
∗
2 = (pmax, 0).
• Equilibrium 3: when g ∈ B3 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6 11+SNRg22 and
g21
g22
6 1
1+SNRg12
}
, then, p∗1 = (0, pmax)
and p∗2 = (0, pmax).
• Equilibrium 4: when g ∈ B4 =
{
g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6 1 + SNRg12 and
g21
g22
> 1
1+SNRg12
}
, then,
p∗1 = (0, pmax) and p
∗
2 = (pmax, 0).
The proof follows immediately from Def. 1 and Tab. 3.
In Fig. 4, we plot the different types of NE action profiles as a function of the channel ratios g11
g12
and
g21
g22
. Note that under the knowledge of all channels, the set of all possible pure NE can be obtained by
simply placing the point
(
g11
g12
, g21
g22
)
in Fig.4. Note how the action profiles p∗ = (pmax, 0, 0, pmax) and
p+ = (0, pmax, pmax, 0) are both NE, when the channel realizations satisfy that g ∈ B5 = B1 ∩ B4, i.e.,
B5 = {g ∈ R4+ :
1
1 + SNRg22
6 g11
g12
6 1 + SNRg21 and
1
1 + SNRg12
6 g21
g22
6 1 + SNRg11}. (18)
This confirms the fact that several NE might exist in the game G(b) depending on the exact channel
realization, as stated in Proposition 1. Moreover, one can also observe that there might exist an NE action
profile which is not a global maximizer of the potential function (9) [33] (e.g., φ (p∗) < φ
(
p+2
)
).
In the sequel, the performance achieved by the transmitters at the equilibrium in both games are compared.
B. A Braess Type Paradox
As suggested in [23], a Braess-type paradox refers to a counter-intuitive observation consisting in a
reduction of the individual utility at the equilibria, when the players are granted with a larger set of
actions. That is, by letting the players to choose from a larger set of options, their individual benefit
reduces. Recently, the Braess-type paradox has been also associated with the reduction of the sum-utility
instead of the individual utilities, as in [20], [25], [34] in the wireless communications arena.
In our particular case, the set of actions for player k in the game G(b), is a subset of its set of actions in
the game G(a), i.e., ∀k ∈ K, P(b)k ⊆ P(a)k . Interestingly, as observed in [23], reducing the set of actions of
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Fig. 4. Nash equilibrium action profiles as a function of the channel ratios g11
g12
and g21
g22
for the two-player-two-channel game G(b),
respectively. The function ψ : R+ → R+ is defined as follows: ψ(x) = 1 + SNRx. The best response function BRk(p−k), for all k ∈ K,
is defined by (12). Here, it has been arbitrarily assumed that ψ(g11) < ψ(g21).
each player leads, in this particular game, to a better global performance. This effect has been reported in
the parallel interference channel in [24], [25] under the consideration of particular channel conditions and
later, more generally in [20]. However, a formal proof of the existence of this paradox is not provided
in the aforementioned references. This observation, has been also reported in the parallel MAC for the
case of successive interference cancellation (SIC) in [35]. Nonetheless, the channel in [35] was not fully
decentralized, as it required a central controller to dictate the channel policy to all the transmitters. In the
following, we study this observation in more detail.
Let us denote by p(†,n)k , the unique NE action profile of game G(a), when the vector g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈
An, for all n ∈ {1 . . . , 8}. Let us also denote by p(∗,n) one of the NE action profiles of game G(b)
when (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ Bn, for all n ∈ {1, . . . 4}. The sets An and Bn are defined in Proposition
2 and 3. Then, for a finite SNR level, one can observe that ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, An ∩ Bn = An and
∀g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ An, the following equality always holds p(†,n)k = p(∗,n)k , which implies the same
network performance. However, when the NE of both games are different, one can not easily compare
the utilities achieved by each player since they depend on the exact channel realizations. Fortunately,
the analysis largely simplifies by considering either a low SNR regime or a high SNR regime and more
general conclusions can be stated. The performance comparison between games G(a) and G(b) for the low
SNR regime is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: In the low SNR regime, both games G(a) and G(b), with K = 2 and S = 2, possess a
unique NE, denoted by p∗. Here, for all k ∈ K and s ∈ S,
p∗k,s = pmax1{
s= arg max
`∈S
gk,`
} (19)
p∗k,−s = pmax − pk,s. (20)
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in App. C. From, Prop 4, it can be stated that at the low SINR regime,
players achieve the NE by simply choosing the channel with the highest channel gain independently of
the other player’s action. The performance comparison between games G(a) and G(b) for the high SNR
regime is presented in the following proposition.
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Proposition 5: In the high SNR regime, with K = 2 and S = 2, the game G(a) has a unique pure NE
denoted by p† and the game G(b) has two pure NE denoted by p(∗,1) and p(∗,4), respectively. Then, at least
for one n ∈ {1, 4}, there exists a SNR value 0 < SNR0 <∞, such that ∀SNR > SNR0,
2∑
k=1
uk
(
p(∗,n)
)− 2∑
k=1
uk(p
†) > δ, (21)
and δ > 0.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in App. D. From the proof of Proposition 5, it can be stated that in
none of the games, players transmit simultaneously on the same channels. Now, from Proposition 4 and
Proposition 5, it can be concluded that at low SNR both games G(a) and G(b) induce the same network
spectral efficiency. On the contrary, the game G(b) always induces a higher or equal network spectral
efficiency than the game G(a) in the high SNR regime. This counter-intuitive result implies a Braess type
paradox, as suggested in the beginning of this subsection.
C. The Case of Large Systems
In this section, we deal with the games G(b) for the case of large networks, i.e., networks with a
large number of transmitters. Within this scenario, the dominant parameter to analyze these games is
the fraction of transmitters using a particular channel. As we shall see, contrary to the case of small
number of transmitters and channels analyzed in the previous section, in the case of large networks,
each player becomes indifferent to the action adopted by each of the other players. Here, each player is
rather concerned with the fractions of players simultaneously playing the same action, i.e., using the same
channel. Hence, one of the interesting issues to be solved is the determination of the repartition of the
users between the different channels at the NE.
As a first step towards identifying the fractions of transmitters per channel at the NE, we first re-write
the potential (9) as a function of the vector x(p) = (x1(p), . . . , xS(p)), where xs(p), with s ∈ S, denotes
the fraction of players transmitting over channel s given the action profile p ∈ P(b). Hence,
∀s ∈ S, xs(p) = |Ks(p)|K
S∑
i=1
xi(p) = 1,
(22)
where Ks(p) ⊆ K is the set of players using channel s given the action profile p ∈ P(b), i.e., Ks(p) =
{k ∈ K : pk,s 6= 0}. Let bs = BsB denote the fraction of bandwidth associated with channel s, such that∑S
s=1 bs = 1. Then, one can write the potential as follows
φ(p) =
S∑
s=1
bs log2
N0Bs + pmax ∑
k∈Ks(p)
gk,s

= S log2(K) +
S∑
s=1
bs log2
NoBs
K
+ xs(p) pmax
 1
|Ks(p)|
∑
k∈Ks(p)
gk,s
 . (23)
Note that the term S log2(K) in (23) does not depend on the actions of the players. Thus, in the following,
we drop it for the sake of simplicity. We assume that the number of players K and the available bandwidth
B grows to infinite at a constant rate µ > 0, while the fractions bs, for all s ∈ S are kept invariant. That
is, the average bandwidth per transmitters is asymptotically constant,
lim
K,B→∞
B
K
= µ. (24)
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Thus, under the assumption of large number of transmitters and for any action profile p ∈ P(b), it follows
that,
∀s ∈ S, 1|Ks(p)|
∑
k∈Ks(p)
gk,s
K→∞−→
∫ ∞
0
λdFgs(λ) = Ωs,
where Fgs is the cumulative probability function associated with the channel gains over dimension s.
Hence, for all action profile p ∈ P(b) adopted by the players, maximizing the function φ (p) in the
asymptotic regime reduces to maximize the function φ˜ (x(p)),
φ˜ (x(p)) =
S∑
s=1
bs log2 (µNo bs + xs(p) pmax Ωs) .
That is, solving the OP, 
max
x=(x1,...,xS)∈RS+
S∑
s=1
bs log2 (µN0 bs + xspmaxΩs) ,
s.t.
S∑
i=1
xi = 1 and ∀i ∈ S, xi > 0,
.
The optimization problem above has a unique solution of the form,
∀s ∈ S, xs = bs
[
1
βk
− µN0
pmaxΩs
]+
, (25)
where βk is Lagrangian multiplier to satisfy the optimization constraints. Interestingly, in the case when
all the channels are described with the same statistics, that is, ∀s ∈ S, Fgs(λ) = Fg(λ), (∀s ∈ S, Ωs = Ω)
it holds that,
∀s ∈ S, xs = Bs
B
. (26)
The above provides a very simple relation between the repartition of the users among the available channels
in the asymptotic regime. Indeed, it can be implied that the number of transmitters using a given channel
s is proportional to the bandwidth allocated to the corresponding channel. In particular, note that this
result generalizes the work in [36].
To conclude on the usefulness of the large system analysis, let us consider the upper bound on the number
of NE which is given by Proposition 1. Let us normalize the upper bound on the number of pure NE L
in (13) by the total number of pure (channel selection) strategy profiles, and let us write,
L
SK
< 1
SK
(
1 + (S − 1) 2K) . (27)
Now, for a sufficiently large number K, the following approximation holds,
1
SK
(
1 + (S − 1) 2K) ≈ (S − 1) ( 2
S
)K
. (28)
Although the number of pure NE in the channel selection game might be conjectured to be large, it
is in fact relatively small in the asymptotic regime. Indeed, (28) indicates that when the number of users
is large, the fraction of pure NE goes to zero whenever the number of channels is greater or equal to 3.
This result shows the difficulty of using methodologies such as the one proposed in Sec. III-C3 to study
the set of NE or the difficulty of achieving equilibria using decentralized learning algorithms as proposed
in [7], [8].
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D. Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability
The price of anarchy (PoA) [37] and the price of stability (PoS)1 [38] are both measures of the efficiency
of the set of equilibria of a game. Basically, the PoA measures the loss of global performance due to
decentralization by comparing the maximum sum utility achieved under the global control of a central
authority with the minimum sum utility achieved at the Nash equilibrium. The PoS measures also the loss
of global performance due to decentralization by comparing the maximum sum utility achieved under the
global control of an authority with the maximum sum utility achieved at the Nash equilibrium. For the
power allocation game G(a) and the channel selection game G(b), the PoA and the PoS can be written as
follows,
PoA
(G(i)) = maxp∈P(i) U
(i)(p)
min
p∈P(i)NE
U (i)(p)
, (29)
and
PoS
(G(i)) = maxp∈P(i) U
(i)(p)
max
p∈P(i)NE
U (i)(p)
, (30)
respectively. Here, i ∈ {a, b}, U (i) is defined in (15) and P(i)NE is the set of NE of the game G(i). Regarding
the optimization problem in the numerator of (29) and (30), we have that the following holds from the
information theoretical upper bound of the sum of individual rates of the multiple access channel [1]:
K∑
k=1
uk(p)
(a)
6
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
1 +
K∑
k=1
pk,sgk,s
σ2s
 (31)
=
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s +
∑
k∈K
pk,sgk,s
)
−
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s
)
, (32)
= φ(p)−
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s
)
, (33)
(b)
6 φ(p‡)−
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s
)
. (34)
Here, (a) holds with strict equality, for any given power allocation vector p, when the receiver implements
(perfect) successive interference cancellation (SIC). Moreover, (b) holds with strict equality when (perfect)
SIC is used at the receiver and p‡ is the power allocation vector at the NE with the highest NSE. That is,
p(‡,i) ∈ arg max
p∈P(i)
φ(p) = arg max
p∈P(i)NE
φ(p), (35)
where, the equality in (35) holds since the maximizers of the function φ are the set of NE as shown in
Sec. III.
Regarding the optimization problem in the denominator of (29) and (30), we use the following notation
p(>,i) ∈ arg max
p∈P(i)NE
U (i)(p) and (36)
p(⊥,i) ∈ arg min
p∈P(i)NE
U (i)(p). (37)
1Note that the PoS as defined in (29) is the multiplicative inverse of the one defined in [38]
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and we write (29) and (30) as follows,
PoA
(G(i)) =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s +
K∑
k=1
p
(‡,i)
k,s gk,s
)
−
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s
)
K∑
k=1
uk(p
(⊥,i))
, (38)
and
PoS
(G(i)) =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s +
K∑
k=1
p
(†,i)
k,s gk,s
)
−
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s
)
K∑
k=1
uk(p
(>,i))
, (39)
respectively.
Now, using the fact that, for all p ∈ P(a),
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s +
K∑
k=1
pk,sgk,s
)
−
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s
)
=
K∑
k=1
S∑
s=1
Bs
B
log2
1 + pk,sgk,sσ2s + ∑
j∈K\{1,...,k}
pj,sgj,s
 ,
we write (29) and (30) as follows,
PoA
(G(i)) =
K∑
k=1
S∑
s=1
Bs
B
log2
1 + p
(‡,i)
k,s gk,s
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{1,...,k}
p
(‡,i)
j,s gj,s

K∑
k=1
S∑
s=1
Bs
B
log2
1 + p
(⊥,i)
k,s gk,s
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{k}
p
(⊥,i)
j,s gj,s

(40)
and
PoS
(G(i)) =
K∑
k=1
S∑
s=1
Bs
B
log2
1 + p
(‡,i)
k,s gk,s
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{1,...,k}
p
(‡,i)
j,s gj,s

K∑
k=1
S∑
s=1
Bs
B
log2
1 + p
(>,i)
k,s gk,s
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{k}
p
(>,i)
j,s gj,s

. (41)
Finally, we highlight that, for all k ∈ K and for all p ∈ P(a) (and thus, for all p ∈ P(b)), we have that,
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
1 + pk,sgk,sσ2s + ∑
j∈K\{1,...,k}
pj,sgj,s
 > ∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
1 + pk,sgk,sσ2s + ∑
j∈K\{k}
pj,sgj,s
 . (42)
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Here, strict equality holds for all k ∈ K, only when transmitters do not share the same channels with
other transmitters. In the following, we use this reasoning to study the PoA and the PoS of both games
G(a) and G(b).
1) PoA and PoS in G(a): As shown in Theorem 1, the set of NE of the game G(a) is unitary. Thus, we
have that,
p(‡,a) = p(>,a) = p(⊥,a), (43)
and thus,
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a)) . (44)
Following Prop. 2, it becomes clear that strict equality in (42) is observed at the equilibrium of the game
G(a), if and only if, transmitters use different channels to communicate with the receiver. In the case in
which K = 2 and S = 2, according to Prop. 2, such condition is fulfilled when g = (g11, g12, g21, g22)
satisfies either g ∈ A1 or g ∈ A4. This observation leads us to the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 (PoA and PoS of G(a)): Let K = 2, S = 2 and g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfy at least one of
the following conditions:
g ∈
{
g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
> 1 + SNRg11
1 + SNRg22
,
g21
g22
6 1 + SNRg11
1 + SNRg22
}
or (45)
g ∈
{
g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 1 + SNRg21
1 + SNRg12
,
g21
g22
> 1 + SNRg21
1 + SNRg12
}
. (46)
Then,
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a)) = 1. (47)
Otherwise,
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a)) > 1, (48)
with strict inequality.
From Lemma 5, the following corollaries follow by taking the limits SNR → 0 and SNR → ∞,
respectively.
Corollary 1 (PoA in the low SNR regime): Let K = 2, S = 2 and g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfy at
least one of the following conditions:
g11 > g12 and g21 6 g22 or (49)
g11 6 g12 and g21 > g22. (50)
Then, in the low SNR regime
(
SNR→ 0),
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a)) = 1, (51)
otherwise,
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a)) < 1 + , (52)
with  > 0 arbitrarily small.
Corollary 2 (PoA in the high SNR regime): Let K = 2, S = 2 and g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfy at
least one of the following conditions:
g22 > g12 and g21 6 g11 or (53)
g11 6 g21 and g12 > g22. (54)
Then, in the high SNR regime, we have that
(
SNR→∞),
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a)) = 1, (55)
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otherwise,
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a))→∞. (56)
In a more general case, for instance K > 2 and S > 2, we state the following result:
Proposition 6 (PoA of the G(a)): Let p∗ ∈ P(a) be the equilibrium of the game G(a) and consider the
following condition:
If ∃(k, s) ∈ K × S : p∗k,s > 0, then ∀j ∈ K \ {k}, p∗j,s = 0. (57)
Then, if the condition above holds, we have that:
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a)) = 1, (58)
otherwise, we have that:
PoA
(G(a)) = PoS (G(a)) > 1 and (59)
lim
SNR→∞
PoA
(G(a)) = lim
SNR→∞
PoS
(G(a)) = ∞. (60)
Note that from Prop. 6, it can be concluded that in the case in which K > S, the PoA is strictly
bigger than one, since the condition (57) does not hold. Thus, as long as K > S there always exists a
loss in performance due to the decentralization of the network. Nonetheless, depending on the channel
realizations, in the case in which K 6 S, global optimal performance can be achieved at the equilibrium.
2) PoA and PoS in G(b): As shown in Theorem 1, the set of NE of the game G(a) is not necessarily
unitary. Thus, we have that if the equilibrium of the game G(a) is not unique, then p(>,a) 6= p(⊥,a) and the
following holds:
PoA
(G(b)) > 1 and (61)
PoS
(G(b)) > 1, (62)
with strict inequality for any channel realization in (61). This is basically because two different NE
action profiles generate the same sum utility with probability zero, when the channel gains are generated
following a continuous distribution. Thus, the numerator is monotonically increasing while the denominator
is monotonically decreasing in (40). On the contrary, in the case of the PoS (62), equality can be observed
whenever p(‡,b) = p(>,b) and (33) holds with equality, which is the case when there exists an equilibrium
where every transmitter uses a different channel from all the other transmitters.
Following the same arguments as in the case of the game G(a), we state that a unitary PoA (PoA = 1) is
observed only when the set of NE is unitary and transmitters do not share the same channels to transmit.
This condition according with Prop. 3, is observed in the game G(b), with K = 2 and S = 2, when
g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfies that g ∈ {B1 ∪ B4} \ B5. This observation leads us to the following
Lemma.
Lemma 6 (PoA of the game G(b)): Let K = 2, S = 2 and g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfy at least one of
the following conditions:
g ∈
{
g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
> 1 + SNRg21,
g21
g22
6 1 + SNRg11
}
, (63)
g ∈
{
g ∈ R4+ :
1
1 + SNRg22
6 g11
g12
6 1 + SNRg21,
g21
g22
6 1
1 + SNRg12
}
, (64)
g ∈
{
g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 1
1 + SNRg22
,
1
1 + SNRg12
6 g21
g22
6 1 + SNRg11
}
or (65)
g ∈
{
g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 1 + SNRg21,
g21
g22
> 1 + SNRg11
}
. (66)
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Then,
PoA
(G(b)) = 1. (67)
Otherwise,
PoA
(G(b)) > 1, (68)
with strict inequality.
In the case of the PoS, we highlight that strict equality holds in (42) when transmitters use different
channels to communicate with the receiver at the equilibrium. This condition is satisfied in the game G(b),
with K = 2 and S = 2, when g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfies either g ∈ B1 or g ∈ B4. Thus, we write
the following Lemma.
Lemma 7 (PoS of the game G(b)): Let K = 2, S = 2 and g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfy at least one of
the following conditions:
g ∈
{
g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
> 1
1 + SNRg22
,
g21
g22
6 1 + SNRg11
}
, or (69)
g ∈
{
g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 1 + SNRg21,
g21
g22
> 1
1 + SNRg12
}
. (70)
Then,
PoS
(G(b)) = 1. (71)
Otherwise,
PoS
(G(b)) > 1, (72)
with strict inequality.
From Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, the following corollaries follow by taking the limits SNR → 0 and
SNR→∞, respectively.
Corollary 3 (PoA and PoS in the low SNR regime): Let K = 2, S = 2 and g = (g11, g12, g21, g22)
satisfy at least one of the following conditions:
g11 > g12 and g21 6 g22 or (73)
g11 6 g12 and g21 > g22. (74)
Then, in the low SNR regime
(
SNR→ 0),
PoA
(G(b)) = PoS (G(b)) = 1, (75)
otherwise,
1 < PoA
(G(b)) = PoS (G(b)) < 1 + , (76)
(77)
with  > 0 arbitrarily small.
Corollary 4 (PoA and PoS in the high SNR regime): Let K = 2, S = 2. Then, in the high SNR regime(
SNR→∞), we have that
PoA
(G(b)) → ∞ (78)
PoS
(G(b)) → 1. (79)
In Corollary 4, (78) follows from the fact that at high SNR, the game G(b), with K = 2 and S = 2,
always possesses two equilibria in pure strategies (Lemma 8). Thus, at the high SNR regime, the numerator
of (29) arbitrarily increases while its denominator arbitrarily decreases. Similarly, at the high SNR regime
both equilibria consist in action profiles where transmitters use different channels to communicate with
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the receiver. Thus, (42) holds with strict equality for the case of the NE with the highest NSE p>, which
justifies (79). In a more general case, for instance K > 2 and S > 2, we state the following result:
Proposition 7 (PoA of the G(b)): Let p∗ ∈ P(b) be an equilibrium of the game G(b) and consider the
following conditions:
(i) p∗ is unique (80)
(ii) If ∃(k, s) ∈ K × S : p∗k,s > 0, then ∀j ∈ K \ {k}, p∗j,s = 0. (81)
Then, if both conditions simultaneously hold, we have that:
PoA
(G(b)) = 1, (82)
otherwise, we have that:
PoA
(G(b)) > 1 and (83)
lim
SNR→∞
PoA
(G(b)) = ∞. (84)
Proposition 8 (PoS of the G(b)): Let p∗ ∈ P(b) be the equilibrium with the highest NSE of the game
G(b) and consider the following condition:
(i) If ∃(k, s) ∈ K × S : p∗k,s > 0, then ∀j ∈ K \ {k}, p∗j,s = 0. (85)
Then, if the condition above holds, we have that:
PoS
(G(b)) = 1, (86)
otherwise, we have that:
PoS
(G(b)) > 1 and (87)
lim
SNR→∞
PoS
(G(b)) → ∞. (88)
Note that from Prop. 7, it can be concluded that in the case in which K > S, the PoA and the
PoS are both strictly bigger than one, since the condition (85) does not hold. Thus, as in the previous
case, as long as K > S there always exists a loss in performance due to the decentralization of the
network. Nonetheless, depending on the channel realizations, in the case in which K 6 S, global optimal
performance can be achieved at the equilibrium.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the previous sections, a mathematical argument has been provided to show that at the low and high
SNR regimes, using a channel selection policy yields a higher or equal NSE than using a water-filling
power allocation policy. A formal proof has been provided for the case of K = 2 transmitters and S = 2
channels. Moreover, we highlight that a CS policy is evidently simpler than a PA policy in terms of
implementation. Unfortunately, providing a formal proof for an arbitrary number of transmitters K and
channels S at a finite SNR becomes a hard task since it will require to calculate all the types of NE
depending on the exact channel realizations. Hence, for the case of arbitrary parameters K, S, and SNR,
we provide only numerical examples to give an insight of the general behavior. First, we evaluate the
impact of the SNR for a network with a fixed number of transmitters and channels. Second, we evaluate
the impact of the network load, i.e., the number of transmitters per channel for a given fixed SNR.
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Fig. 6. Probability of observing a specific number of NE in the game G(b) calculated using Monte-Carlo simulations.
A. Impact of the SNR pmax
σ2
In Fig. 5, we plot the network spectral efficiency as a function of the average SNR of the transmitters.
Here, it is shown that in fully-loaded and over-loaded networks, i.e., η = K
S
> 1, the gain in NSE obtained
by using a discrete action set (game G(a)) increases with the SNR. Conversely, for weakly loaded networks
η < 1, limiting the transmitters to use a single channel appears to be suboptimal as the SNR increases. This
is basically because using only one channel, necessarily implies letting some interference-free channels
unused. Interestingly, at low SNR, the NSE observed in both games is the same, independently of the
load of the system. In both cases, high SNR and low SNR regime, the observed results are in line with
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
In Fig. 6, we plot the probability of observing a specific number of NE in the game G(b) for different
values of SNR. This probability is calculated as the empirical frequency of the number of NE observed
in 106 realizations of the game G(a) and G(b). At each game realization, a new channel matrix realization
H is considered. In the first case (Fig. 6 (a)), we consider S = 2 and K = 3, whereas in the second
case (Fig. 6 (b)), K = 3 and S = 3. Note that from Proposition 1, the maximum number of NE is 4 and
7, respectively. However, only 3 and 6 NE are respectively observed in the simulations. This observation
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levels in dBs.
joints the discussion on the tightness of the bound presented in Sec. III-C2. Note that Proposition 1 relies
only on the number of transmitters and available channels. A tighter bound can be obtained if the actual
channel realizations are considered. However, this might be significantly tedious for networks with large
number of transmitters. Moreover, note also that low SNR levels are associated with a unique NE (with
high probability), whereas, high SNR levels are associated with multiple NE (with high probability). Note
that this observation, at least for the case of K = 2 and S = 2, is inline with Proposition 4 and Proposition
5.
B. Impact of the Number of Transmitters (K)
In Fig. 7, we plot the NSE as a function of the number of transmitters per channel, i.e., the system
load η = K
S
. Therein, one can observe that for weakly loaded systems η < 1, playing G(a) always leads
to higher NSE than playing G(b). This is natural since restricting the transmitters to use only one channel
implies not using other channels which are interference-free, as S > K. On the contrary, for fully-loaded
and over-loaded systems, the NSE of the game G(a) is at least equal or better than that of the game G(b).
Indeed, the fact that for high system loads η > 2, the NSE obtained by playing the game G(a) and G(b)
become identical stems from the fact that under this condition the system becomes dominated by the
interference.
In Fig. 8, we plot the PoA (29) of both games G(a) and G(b) as a function of the number of transmitters
for several SNR values. First, we highlight the fact that as shown in our theoretical analysis, optimal
performance (PoA(G(b)) = 1) is achieved in the case of low density networks η 6 1 using channel
selection. Note also that in the case of the power allocation game PoA(G(a)) > 1 independently of
the network load, which implies that there always exists a loss of performance when the network is
decentralized and the transmitters are allowed to use several channels simultaneously.
Finally, in Fig. 9, we show the fractions xs of transmitters using channel s, with s ∈ S, obtained
by Monte-Carlo simulations and using (26) for a large network with an asymptotic ratio of players per
channel equivalent to η = 10. Therein, it becomes clear that (26) is a precise estimation of the outcome
of the games G(a) and G(b) in the regime of large number of players.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, it is shown to what extent the equilibrium analysis of the decentralized parallel MAC
differs from those conducted for other channels like Gaussian MIMO interference channels and fast
fading MIMO MAC. In particular, the special structure of parallel MAC and the assumption of single-
user decoding at the receiver leads to the potential game property. The channel selection game was merely
introduced in the literature but not investigated in details as it is in this paper. In particular, a graph-theoretic
interpretation is used to characterize the number of NE. In the case where the number of transmitters
is large, the fraction between pure NE and the total number of action profiles is relatively small, which
makes both the analysis and the achievability of the NE a challenging task. Now, from a design point of
view, we provide theoretical results and numerical examples to show that a fully loaded network, when
transmitters use only one channel, can be more efficient than its counterpart when all the channels can
be exploited by the transmitters. Although all of these results are encouraging about the relevance of
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game-theoretic analyses of power allocation problems, important practical issues have been deliberately
ignored. For example, the impact of channel estimation is not assessed at all. Also, it is important to
conduct a detailed analysis on the signaling cost involved by all the power allocation algorithms arising
from this game formulations to learn NE.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In this appendix, we provide a proof of Proposition 1, which establishes an upper bound for the number
of NE of the game G(b). Here, we exploit some basic tools from graph theory. Let us index the elements
of the action set P(b) in any given order using the index n ∈ I = {1, . . . , SK}. Denote by p(n) the n-th
element of the action set P(b). We write each vector p(n) with n ∈ I, as p(n) =
(
p
(n)
1 , . . . ,p
(n)
K
)
, where
for all j ∈ K, p(n)j ∈ P(b)j . Consider that each action profile p(n) is associated with a vertex vn in a given
non-directed graph G. Each vertex vn is adjacent to the K(S − 1) vertices associated with the action
profiles resulting when only one player deviates from the action profile p(n), i.e., if two vertices vn and
vm, with (n,m) ∈ I2 and n 6= m, are adjacent, then there exists one and only one k ∈ K, such that
∀j ∈ K \ {k}, p(n)j = p(m)j , and p(n)k 6= p(m)k .
More precisely, the graph G can be defined by the pair G = (V ,A), where the set V = {v1, . . . , vSK}
(nodes) represents the SK possible actions profiles of the game and A (edges) is a symmetric matrix
(adjacency matrix of G) with dimensions SK × SK and entries defined as follows ∀(n,m) ∈ I2 and
n 6= m,
an,m = am,n =
{
1 if n ∈ Vm
0 otherwise , (89)
and an,n = 0 for all n ∈ I, where the set Vn is the set of indices of the adjacent vertices of vertex vn.
In the following, we use the concept of distance between two vertices of the graph G. We define this
concept using our notation:
Definition 4 (Shortest Path): The distance (shortest path) between vertices vn and vm, with (n,m) ∈ I2
in a given non-directed graph G = (V , A), denoted by dn,m(G) ∈ N is:
dn,m(G) = dm,n(G) =
K∑
k=1
1{
p
(n)
k 6=p
(m)
k
}. (90)
Here, for any pair of action profiles p(n) and p(m), with (n,m) ∈ I2 and n 6= m, we have that φ(p(n)) 6=
φ(p(m)) with probability one. This is because channel gains are random variables drawn from continuous
probability distributions and thus, Pr
(
φ(p(n)) = φ(p(m)) | n 6= m) = 0. Hence, following Def. 1, one can
state that if the action profile p(n), with n ∈ I, is an NE of the game G(b), then, it follows that
∀m ∈ V(n), φ(p(n)) > φ(p(m)), (91)
and thus, with probability one, none on the action profiles in V(n) are NE. By iteratively following this
procedure over the remaining set of action profiles I \ {n∪V(n)}, some action profiles can be eliminated
and only those that are potentially NE are left over.
Thus, given that the action profile p(n) is an NE, the action profile p(m), with n 6= m, can be an NE
candidate, if it is (at least) at distance two of p(n) and any other NE candidate, i.e., dn,m(G) = dm,n(G) ∈
{2, 4, . . . , Kˆ}. An action profile at distance ` ∈ {2, 4, . . . , Kˆ} from p(n), is a vector where ` players have
simultaneously deviated from p(n). Hence, for each `-tuple of players, there always exists S − 1 action
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profiles at distance ` from p(n) and at distance 2 from each other. Thus, considering the initial NE action
profile p(n), there might exist at most
L 6 1 +
∑
i∈{2,4,...,Kˆ}
(
K
i
)
(S − 1) (92)
NE candidates. This establishes an upper bound for L and completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
In this appendix, we provide a proof for the Proposition 2. The proof is separated in two steps. First,
we show that a power allocation vector p = (p1,p2) ∈ P(a) of the form
p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) and p2 = (pmax − p22, p22) ,
is not an NE of the game G(a), when p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[. Second, we show that if p is an
NE, then, p is unique and satisfies that, p ∈ P†, where
P† = P(a) \ {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22)
∈ R4+ : p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[ }.
In the following, we use the notation −c to denote the element other than c in the binary set C.
First Step: Assume that the action profile p = (p1,p2), with p1 = (p11, p12) and p2 = (p21, p22) is an
NE of the game G(a), and assume that for all (k, s) ∈ K × S, pk,s > 0, with strict inequality. Then, from
the best response correspondence, it holds that ∀(k, s) ∈ K × S,
p†k,s =
[
1
βk
− σ
2 + g−k,sp
†
−k,s
gk,s
]+
, (93)
with βk a Langrangian multiplier chosen to satisfy (2). Then, from 93, it can be implied that ∀k ∈ K,
pk,s =
1
βk
− σ
2 + p−k,sg−k,s
gk,s
> 0 and (94)
pk,−s =
1
βk
− σ
2 + p−k,−sg−k,−s
gk,−s
> 0. (95)
Then, from the fact that ∀k ∈ K, pk,s + pk,−s = pmax, we have that,
pk,k =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2+g−k,k(pmax−p−k,−k)
gk,k
+
σ2+g−k,−kp−k,−k
gk,−k
)
pk,−k = pmax − pk,k.
(96)
Using a matrix notation, the system of equations (96) can be written in terms of p11 and p22 as follows:
C
(
p11
p22
)
= A, (97)
where, the matrix C is
C =
(
2g11g12 − (g22g11 + g21g12)
− (g22g11 + g21g12) 2g22g21
)
and, the vector A is
A =
(
pmaxg12 (g11 − g21) + σ2 (g11 − g12)
pmaxg21 (g22 − g12) + σ2 (g22 − g21)
)
. (98)
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Note that the system of equations (97) has a unique solution as long as the set of channels {g11, g12, g21, g22}
satisfies the condition g12g21 − g11g22 6= 0. Let us continue the analysis under the assumption that,
g12g21− g11g22 6= 0 (the case where g12g21− g11g22 = 0 is treated later). Then, the unique solution of (97)
is ∀k ∈ K,
pk,k =
pmaxg−k,k (gk,−k + g−k,−k)
g12g21 − g11g22
+
σ2 (g−k,k + g−k,−k)
g12g21 − g11g22 ,
pk,−k = pmax − pk,k.
Note that if g12g21 − g11g22 < 0, then ∀k ∈ K, pk,k < 0, and, if g12g21 − g11g22 > 0, then ∀k ∈ K,
pk,k > pmax, which contradicts the initial power constraints (2). Hence, any vector p = (p1,p2), with
p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) and p2 = (pmax − p22, p22), such that ∀(k, s) ∈ K×S, 0 < pk,s < pmax is not an NE
for the game G(a) when g12g21− g11g22 6= 0. Assume now that g12g21− g11g22 = 0, and let α = g21g11 =
g22
g12
.
Then, the PA vector in (96) can be written as follows, for k = 1{
p11 = αp22 +
1
2
(
pmax (1− α) + σ2
(
1
g12
− 1
g11
))
p12 = pmax − p11.
(99)
and, for k = 2, {
p22 =
1
2
(
pmax
(
1 + 1
α
)
+ σ2
(
1
g21
− 1
g22
))
+ 1
α
p11
p21 = pmax − p22,
(100)
Note that the first equations in both (99) and (100) are identical. Thus, we focus only on the first equation
in (99). This implies that any PA vector, p = (p1,p2), with p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) ∈ P(a)1 and p2 =
(pmax − p22, p22) ∈ P(a)2 satisfying the condition
p11 =
1
2
(
pmax (1− α) + σ2
(
1
g12
− 1
g11
))
+ αp22 (101)
is an NE of the game G(a) when g12g21 − g11g22 = 0 as long as ∀(k, s) ∈ K × S, 0 < pk,s < pmax. For
satisfying the latter conditions, it suffices to ensure that: 0 < p11 < pmax when p22 = 0 and p22 = pmax.
Solving these inequalities leads to the following conditions over the channels:
(i) p11 > 0, when p22 = 0, if
1 + pmax
σ2
g21
1 + pmax
σ2
g12
<
g11
g12
(102)
.
(ii) p11 > 0, when p22 = pmax, if
1
1 + pmax
σ2
(g12 + g22)
<
g11
g12
. (103)
(iii) p11 < pmax, when p22 = 0, if
g11
g12
< 1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) (104)
(iv) p11 < pmax, when p22 = pmax, if
g11
g12
< 1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) (105)
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Finally, we obtain that if the vector of channels g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfies that
min
(
1
1 + pmax
σ2
(g12 + g22)
,
1 + pmax
σ2
g21
1 + pmax
σ2
g12
)
< α and
max
(
1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) ,
1 + pmax
σ2
g11
1 + pmax
σ2
g22
)
> α,
that is,
1
1 + pmax
σ2
(g12 + g22)
< α < 1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) ,
then any vector p = (p1,p2), with p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) ∈ P(a)1 and p2 = (pmax − p22, p22) ∈ P(a)2
satisfying the condition (101) is an NE of the game G(a). Note that infinitely many PA vectors might satisfy
(101), which implies infinitely many NE. However, since the channels are realizations of random variables
drawn from a continuous distribution, the probability of observing a realization such that g12g21−g11g22 = 0
is zero. Thus, with probability one, any vector p = (p1,p2), with p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) and p2 =
(pmax − p22, p22), such that ∀(k, s) ∈ K × S, 0 < pk,s < pmax is not an NE for the game G(a).
Second Step: Consider that p† =
(
p†1,p
†
2
)
∈ P(a) is an NE. Then, it must follow that p† ∈ P†, where,
P† = P \ {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22) ∈ R4+ : p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[ }
=
8⋃
n=1
P†i , (106)
where the sets P†n ⊂ P(a), for all n ∈ {1, . . . , 8} are described as follows. The singletons P†1 =
{p = (pmax, 0, 0, pmax)}, P†2 = {p = (pmax, 0, pmax, 0)}, P†3 = {p = (0, pmax, 0, pmax)}, P†4 = {p =
(0, pmax, pmax, 0)} and the convex non-closed sets,
P†5 = {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22) ∈ R4+ : p11 = pmax, and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[},
P†6 = {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22) ∈ R4+ : p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 = pmax},
P†7 = {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22) ∈ R4+ : p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 = 0},
P†8 = {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22) ∈ R4+ : p11 = 0, and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[}.
In the following, we identify the conditions over the channel vector g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) such that
each p† ∈ P†n, with n ∈ {1, . . . , 8} is an NE.
Assume that p† ∈ P†8 , i.e., p†1 = (0, pmax) and p†2 =
(
pmax − p†22, p†22
)
, with p†22 ∈ ]0, pmax[. Then, from
(93) with k = 2, we have that:
p†21 =
1
β2
− σ
2
g21
> 0 and (107)
p†22 =
1
β2
− σ
2 + g12pmax
g22
> 0. (108)
Then, since p†21 + p
†
22 = pmax, we have that
1
β2
= 1
2
(
pmax +
σ2+pmaxg12
g22
+ σ
2
g21
)
, and thus,
p†22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2 + g12pmax
g22
+
σ2
g21
)
, (109)
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where, it must satisfy that 0 < p†22 < pmax. The inequality p
†
22 > 0, holds only if
g21
g22
<
1+
pmaxg21
σ2
1+
pmaxg12
σ2
, whereas
the inequality p†22 < pmax holds only if
g21
g22
> 1
1+SNR(g12+g22)
. Similarly, from (93) with k = 1, we have
that given p†22, in order to obtain p
†
11 = 0 and p
†
12 = pmax, it must hold that
p11 =
1
β1
−
σ2 + g21
(
pmax − p†22
)
g11
6 0 and
p12 =
1
β1
− σ
2 + g22p
†
22
g12
> pmax. (110)
Hence, by doing p12 − p11 in (110), we obtain that:
σ2 + g21
(
pmax − p†22
)
g11
− σ
2 + g22p
†
22
g12
6 pmax. (111)
Then, by replacing (109) in (111), we obtain that the condition (110) are satisfied only if the channels
satisfy that:
g11
g12
6 g21
g22
. (112)
Hence, we can conclude that whenever the vector g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ A8, the NE is of the form
(p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22), with p11 = 0 and p22 = 12
(
pmax − σ2+g12pmaxg22 + σ
2
g21
)
. Now, assuming that
p† ∈ P†n, with n ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, leads to the conditions of the other types of NE, i.e., the corresponding
sets An, such that whenever g ∈ An then p† ∈ P†n. It is important to note that, for any particular vector
g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ R4, there exists, with probability one, only one set An which satisfies that
g ∈ An. This is basically because for all (n,m) ∈ {1, . . . , 4}2, with n 6= m, it follows that An∩Am = ∅.
Now, for all (n,m) ∈ {5, . . . , 8}2, with n 6= m, it follows that An ∩Am ⊂ {g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ R4 :
g11g22 = g12g21} and observing a channel realization g, such that, g11g22 = g12g21 is a zero probability
event, since all channel gains are drawn from continuous probability distributions. Thus, with probability
one, the game G(a) has unique NE. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
In this appendix, we provide a proof of the Proposition 4. The Proposition 4 basically states that at
low SNR regime if an action profile p is a NE of the game G(a), then it is also a NE of the game G(b)
and it is unique. The proof follows from the fact that in the asymptotic regime, i.e., SNR → 0, the set
An and the set Bn become identical, when n ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Moreover, the sets Am, with m ∈ {5, . . . 8}
become empty. The sets A1, . . . ,A4 and the sets B1, . . . ,B8 are given by Proposition 2 and Proposition
28
3, respectively. Then,
lim
SNR→0
A1 = lim
SNR→0
B1 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
> 1 and
g21
g22
6 1}
lim
SNR→0
A2 = lim
SNR→0
B2 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
> 1 and
g21
g22
> 1}
lim
SNR→0
A3 = lim
SNR→0
B3 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 1 and
g21
g22
6 1}
lim
SNR→0
A4 = lim
SNR→0
B4 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 1 and
g21
g22
> 1}
and moreover,
lim
SNR→0
A5 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
= 1 and
g21
g22
= 1},
and
∀n ∈ {6, . . . , 8}, lim
SNR→0
An = ∅. (113)
Now, since the sets A1, . . . ,A4 or the sets B1, . . . ,B4 cover, in the asymptotic regime, all the space of
vectors g and both An and Bn determine a unique NE in the game G(b) and G(a), respectively, it follows
that the NE of both games is identical in the asymptotic regime. The uniqueness of the NE in the game
G(a) holds with probability one, independently of the SNR level (Proposition 2). In the game G(b), the NE
is not unique if and only if g ∈ A5. Nonetheless, since for all (k, s) ∈ K × S , gk,s is a realization of a
random variable drawn from a continuous probability distribution, we have that
Pr (g ∈ A5) = 0. (114)
Thus, with probability one, the NE of the game G(b) is unique in the low SNR regime, which completes
the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
In this appendix, we provide the proof of Proposition 5, which states that at the high SNR regime there
always exists an NE action profile in the game G(b), which leads to an equal or better global performance
than the unique NE of the game G(a). Before we start, we introduce two lemmas which are used in the
proof.
Lemma 8: In the high SNR regime, the game G(a) possesses a unique NE, which can be of six different
types depending on the channel realizations {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S:
• Equilibrium 1: if g ∈ A′1 = {g ∈ R4+ : g22 > g12, and g21 6 g11}, then, p†11 = pmax and p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 4: if g ∈ A′4{g ∈ R4+ : g11 6 g21, and g12 > g22}, then, p†11 = 0 and p†22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 5: if g ∈ A′5 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
g21
g22
, and g21 > g11}, then, p†11 = pmax and
p†22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2g22 +
σ2+g11pmax
g21
)
.
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• Equilibrium 6: if g ∈ A′6 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
g21
g22
, and g22 < g12}, then, p†11 = 12
(
pmax − σ2g11 +
σ2+pmaxg22
g12
)
and p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 7: if g ∈ A′7 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
g21
g22
, and g11 > g21}, then, p†11 = 12
(
pmax − σ2+pmaxg21g11 + σ
2
g12
)
and p†22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 8: if g ∈ A′8 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
g21
g22
, and g12 < g21}, then, p†11 = 0 and p†22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2+g12pmaxg22 + σ
2
g21
)
.
The proof of Lemma 8 follows the same reasoning of the proof of Prop 2. Here, ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , 8},
A′n = lim
SNR→∞
An, where the sets A1, . . . ,A8 are given by Proposition 2.
In the following lemma, we describe the set of NE of the game G(b) in the high SNR regime.
Lemma 9: In the high SNR regime, the game G(b) always possesses two NE action profiles:
p∗,11 = (0, pmax) and p
∗,1
2 = (pmax, 0) (115)
and
p∗,41 = (pmax, 0) and p
∗,4
2 = (0, pmax), (116)
independently of the channel realizations.
In the high SNR, i.e., SNR→∞, the sets B1, . . . ,B4, given by Proposition 3, become the following sets,
lim
SNR→+∞
B1 = lim
SNR→+∞
B4 = R4+ (117)
lim
SNR→+∞
B2 = lim
SNR→+∞
B3 = ∅. (118)
Thus, one can immediately imply that
Pr
(
g ∈ lim
SNR→+∞
B2
)
= Pr
(
g ∈ lim
SNR→+∞
B3
)
= 0,
and,
Pr
(
g ∈ lim
SNR→+∞
B1
)
= Pr
(
g ∈ lim
SNR→+∞
B4
)
= 1.
Hence, from Proposition 3, we imply that both p(∗,1) and p(∗,4) are NE action profiles of the game G(b)
in the high SNR regime regardless of the exact channel realizations {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S , which completes the
proof.
From Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, it is easy to see that if g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ A′n, with n ∈ {1, 4},
then (21) holds since p† and at least one of the NE action profiles p∗,n, with n ∈ {1, 4} are identical. In
the cases where g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ A′n, with n ∈ {5, . . . , 8}, we prove by inspection that in all the
cases condition (21) always holds for both NE action profiles p(∗,1) and p(∗,4). For instance, assume that
g ∈ A′5. Then, we have that the unique NE of the game G(a) is p† = (p†11, pmax−p†11, pmax−p†22, p†22), with
p†11 = pmax and p
†
22 =
1
2
(
pmax +
σ2+pmaxg11
g21
− σ2
g22
)
(See Lemma 8). Define the function ψ : R+ → R+ as
follows: ψ(x) = 1 + SNRx, with SNR = pmax
σ2
, and denote by ∆1 (SNR), the difference between the NSE
achieved by playing G(a) and G(b), with respect to the NE p∗,1 at SNR level SNR, i.e.,
∆1 (SNR) = u1
(
p∗,1
)
+ u2
(
p∗,1
)−(
u1
(
p†
)
+ u2
(
p†
))
= 2 log2 (2)− 2 log2
(
1 +
g21
g22
ψ(g22)
ψ(g11)
)
−
log2
(
1 +
g22
g21
ψ(g11)
ψ(g22)
)
+
log2
(
g21
g22
+ ψ(g21 − g11)
)
.
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Note that if g ∈ A′5, then g21 > g11. Hence,
lim
SNR→∞
∆1 (SNR) = ∞,
which justifies (21). Similarly, denote ∆4 (SNR), the difference between the NSE achieved by playing
G(a) and G(b), with respect to the NE p∗,4, i.e.,
∆4 (SNR) = u1 (p
∗,4) + u2 (p∗,4)−(
u1
(
p†
)
+ u2
(
p†
))
= 2 log2 (2)− 2 log2
(
1 +
g22
g21
ψ(g21)
ψ(g12)
)
− log2
(
1 +
g21
g22
ψ(g12)
ψ(g21)
)
(119)
+ log2
(
g22
g21
+ ψ(g22 − g12)
)
. (120)
Note that if g ∈ A′5, then g22 > g12. Hence,
lim
SNR→∞
∆4 (SNR) = ∞,
which justifies (21). Hence, one can imply that in the high SNR regime both NE action profiles p∗,1 and
p∗,2, satisfy (21) when g ∈ A′5. The same result as the one obtained when g ∈ A′5, is also obtained
when g ∈ A′n, with n ∈ {6, . . . , 8}, which completes the proof.
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